How not to manage a vulnerability

Posted on Friday, August 11, 2006 in Ruby On Rails

Following on from my previous posts, Ruby on Rails 1.1.6 is now out along with full disclosure of the vulnerability. There is also a new Rails security announcement mailing list which can only be A Good Thing™.

However whilst I think their speed of reponse has been excellent, their initial “security through obscurity” stance was inappropriate for both a) an Open Source project and b) one written in an interpreted language, and the rapid succession of releases implies they reacted too hastily.

The issue is in fact of such a criticality that we’re not going to dig into the specifics. No need to arm would-be assalients[sic].

…means nothing.

Regarding security through obscurity, we’ll release the full details of this issue once everyone has had a fair chance to upgrade their system. Source transparency is of little comfort if you just had your system compromised before you got a chance to apply the patch.

… means nothing too. Anyone wanting to know how the vulnerability worked (i.e. attackers) simply looked at the source, whilst the people not sure if they needed to upgrade right now were left in the dark unless they knew the internals of Rails intimately (i.e. not many).

Fortunately for me, the applications hosted here are low traffic and a brief downtime was acceptable to remain secure but I bet this was a real headache for the large Rails driven sites.

Related posts:

Mandatory Upgrade "They might want to replace that one" by Unhindered... How to install Ruby on Rails on Ubuntu The instructions for installing Ruby on Rails have always been... A Fresh Cup Last night, thanks to Twitter, I got to renew a... No one said it would be easy Elliot bemoans the fact that hosting a Ruby on Rails... Running Typo svn on Debian Stable (Sarge) After numerous attempts to upgrade this site to the latest...

Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.

I don’t know about large rails sites, but it was certainly a headache for the typo team. Especially once it turned out that 1.1.5 didn’t stop the denial of service attack.

Still, the work we did to get rid of the default @:controller/:action/:id@ route wasn’t necessarily in vain.

And I think wherein you stated large scale rails sites were affected lies the crux of the problem. For all we know though, some larger-scale sites may have already patched this and told nobody though its highly unlikely. This is making it more and more of a problem for those companies with rails production teams to have need for security-minded people as part of them. dev is one thing, security-dev is another and being able to spot holes often happens after their exploited. Nice summary. - ben @ http://rubyonrailsblog.com/


Mobilized by Mowser Mowser
Mobilytics